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Essay
Martyrdom and Religious Freedom
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND
When we give religious exemptions, why do we do it?  Is it because we think 
people will back down otherwise or because we think they won’t?  What exactly 
are religious exemptions trying to avoid?  The harm to conscience that submission 
would bring?  Or the defiance and resistance that refusal would entail?
The easy answer is both.  And it is the truthful answer as well.  We give 
religious exemptions both to avoid the prospect of martyrdom and to avoid the 
prospect of broken consciences.  Religious exemptions protect human dignity and 
freedom; they also avert open contestation between church and state.  Both things 
are good, and there is no need to choose between them. 
Yet even so, the above questions still linger.  And how you think about them 
can end up coloring your approach to all kinds of things: which claims should 
succeed and which should fail, how doctrine ought to be constructed, and what 
religious liberty is all about.
This symposium essay ponders these questions, drawing from the length of the 
American experience.  Its basic premise is that martyrdom matters—that religious 
liberty has and will be shaped by the willingness of people to suffer for their faith.  
Along the way, it tries to offer some more specific and provocative thoughts.
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Martyrdom and Religious Freedom
CHRISTOPHER C. LUND *
INTRODUCTION
Two years ago, Notre Dame held a symposium, Religious Liberty and 
the Free Society. At the time, Little Sisters of the Poor was pending at the 
Supreme Court and no one knew how it would be resolved.1 Little Sisters 
of the Poor involved the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate as it 
applied to religious nonprofits.2 The nonprofits objected to the partial 
exemption available to them, under which insurers and third-party 
administrators would provide the objectionable forms of contraception to 
their employees. Instead they wanted a total exemption from the 
mandate—like the one given to houses of worship—under which 
employees would not receive the prohibited forms of contraception at all.
The keynote speaker at the symposium was John Garvey, the president 
of Catholic University, which at the time was a plaintiff in a companion 
case to Little Sisters of the Poor.3 In the audience was John Jenkins, the 
president of Notre Dame, another plaintiff in another companion case.4
There were a lot of smart people in the room that day and a lot of concern 
about the mandate.
Garvey came before us in two different sets of shoes. As President of 
Catholic University, he was effectively a litigant in these cases. But
Garvey’s experience as a university president had been preceded by a long 
and distinguished career as a lawyer, law professor, and First Amendment 
expert. No one could claim to know church-state matters better than 
                                                                                                                         
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. I would like to thank Marc DeGirolami, 
Chad Flanders, John Inazu, Douglas Laycock, Micah Schwartzman, and Elizabeth Sepper for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts. A workshop at Wayne State University Law School greatly improved this 
piece.
1 The case was consolidated with others into Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per 
curiam).
2 Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015). The 
Court’s earlier decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), involved the 
right of religious for-profit corporations. The Court resolved the case by giving religious for-profit 
corporations the same partial exemption previously given to religious nonprofit corporations. Id. at 
2782–83.
3 Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); see also Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
136 S. Ct. 446 (2015).
4 Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 772 F.3d 229, 255–56 (D.C. Cir. 
2014), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik v. Burwell 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
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Garvey; he wrote a leading church-state casebook and several important 
articles.5 Garvey knew law and he knew Catholic theology. Maybe more 
than any other single person, Garvey could talk with confidence about both 
the legal and religious issues at stake—he could speak both objectively 
about the law and about how it was subjectively experienced.
Unfortunately Garvey’s keynote was apparently not recorded. But I 
remember a question from the audience. A woman, clearly on the 
University’s side of the dispute, asked Garvey what would happen if 
Catholic University lost. She wanted to know what other means of fighting 
would be at the University’s disposal. Now Garvey could have said simply 
that, once its legal options were exhausted, Catholic University would 
(however reluctantly) comply with the mandate. In our day and age, this is 
what one expects. And as I remember it, Garvey’s demeanor suggested this 
is indeed what would probably happen, though his words were more 
reserved, emphasizing the need to wait and see. 
But what if Garvey had given the other answer? What if Garvey had 
said Catholic University would never comply, whatever the cost—that it 
would fight them on the beaches, and on the landing grounds, and that it 
would never surrender. It would defy the mandate; it would incur the 
millions in fines. Eventually Catholic University would owe itself to the 
Department of Health and Human Services, and John Garvey himself 
would walk to the White House to turn over the keys of the University to 
the federal government. Such things may strike you as unlikely, even silly 
to contemplate. But say you genuinely believed this is what would happen 
without an exemption. Does it change anything about how you see the 
case?
How much of a role does martyrdom, and fears of martyrdom, have in 
our system? When we give religious exemptions, is it because we think 
people will back down otherwise or because we think they won’t? What is 
religious liberty trying to avoid—the prospect of martyrs or the prospect of 
broken consciences? Formal doctrine, at least most of the time, does not 
ask about such things; the law has an official policy of not inquiring into 
how its official policy will be received. Yet maybe martyrdom, and the 
prospects of martyrdom, do matter. Maybe such things do enter, however 
subtly and however modestly, into how controversies between church and 
state are framed and resolved.6
                                                                                                                         
5 MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (3d ed. 2011); John H. Garvey, An Anti-Liberal Argument for Religious Freedom,
7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 275 (1996); John H. Garvey, What’s Next After Separationism?, 46 
EMORY L.J. 75 (1997); John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 
MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1998); see also JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996).
6 A line from Robert Cover comes to mind: “The stories the resisters tell, the lives they live, the 
law they make in such a movement may force the judges, too, to face the commitments entailed in their 
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This symposium essay touches upon a wide range of subjects, from 
religious voluntarism to the law of civil contempt; from some renowned 
nineteenth century polygamy cases to some uncomfortable modern cases 
of child abuse and neglect. It looks at history and theory, and even a bit of 
doctrine—a few stray and probably unintended sentences by Chief Justice 
Burger in a case from the 1980s, it turns out, have caused a fascinating bit 
of havoc in the lower courts. 
This piece is a brief exploration of martyrdom and some of the issues it 
presents. These matters are too complex to yield much in the way of firm 
conclusions or tidy prescriptions. But the basic premise here is that 
martyrdom matters—that religious liberty has and will be shaped by the 
willingness of people to suffer for their faith. And recurring throughout this 
piece will be a provocative and highly speculative thought—that religious 
liberty has a less certain future in a world without martyrdom, in a world 
where people do not suffer for their faiths.
No one doubts religious folks are harmed when they back down and 
conform. But that harm is internal to them, private and somewhat invisible, 
easy to dismiss and maybe even to forget. When the religious suffer in 
secular terms—when they go to prison, are fired from their jobs, lose their 
churches or custody of their children—their suffering becomes more 
visible and more easily understood outside the faith. Such suffering 
provides a secular metric by which religious passion and commitment can 
be gauged—a way ethereal religious devotion can be cashed out into hard 
secular currency. Religious beliefs themselves may not translate, but the 
willingness to suffer for them speaks in a language of its own. It is that 
willingness to suffer which gave birth to religious liberty—that suffering 
was the crucible in which the concept was forged—and it is worth 
pondering what will happen to religious liberty if it goes away. Yet this
piece advances no great thesis. It contents itself with pondering over 
eternally recurring questions and themes. If there are answers here, they are 
for the reader to find.
I. MARTYRDOM, BROKEN CONSCIENCE, AND FUTILE COMPLIANCE
When religious commitment collides with legal obligation, that is 
where free exercise takes shape. In the classic formulation, religious 
believers must choose between two masters—God or Caesar, church or 
state. Of course, the law might bend to ameliorate the conflict; this is the 
issue of religious exemptions, with its own intricate history.7 But if the law 
                                                                                                                         
judicial office and their law.” Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
68 (1983).
7 For an overview of that history, see Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A 
Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 469–73 (2010).
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proves intransigent, the religious believer must ultimately choose between 
faith or law without being able to satisfy both.
At this point, the road forks. A religious believer might choose faith, 
accepting the legal consequences as simply the cost of living faithfully in 
an unfaithful world. This we will call martyrdom. Or a religious believer 
might choose law instead of faith, backing down and accepting his or her 
own apparent unfaithfulness. This we will call broken conscience. The first 
is the path of defiance and resistance; the second is the path of 
acquiescence and submission. And connected to these ideas will be others. 
Sometimes, for example, the state might lose interest in coercing 
compliance because coerced compliance is in some way self-defeating—a
kind of contradiction in terms. A Quaker, for example, may be such a 
terrible solider that the state may have no interest in conscripting him even 
if he agrees to go.8 Maybe call this the idea of futile compliance.
The reasons for religious freedom are messy and overlapping, and any 
plausible theory of religious liberty has to include both martyrdom and 
broken conscience as rationales.9 Sometimes thought of as the earliest Free 
Exercise case in America, People v. Philips10 involved a priest who refused 
to testify against a thief that he recognized from the confessional.11 The 
court explained the dilemma: “If [the priest] tells the truth, he violates his 
ecclesiastical oath—If he prevaricates he violates his judicial oath—
Whether he lies, or whether he testifies the truth he is wicked.”12 This is 
the familiar catch-22 at the root of all cases involving religious 
exemptions, then and now. The priest cannot satisfy the requirements of 
both the law and his faith. He must choose one and face the other’s wrath.
As courts often do, Philips does not discuss the prospect of 
martyrdom—the court assumes that, if push came to shove, the priest 
would comply with the law despite his faith. Maybe there is a subtle point 
to make here; maybe it says something about the judicial craft that judges 
do not like thinking too much (at least openly) about the prospect of people 
defying their orders. So instead of talking about the harms of incarceration, 
the court instead talks about the harm of forcing the priest to testify against 
                                                                                                                         
8 See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452–53 (1971) (noting “the hopelessness of 
converting a sincere conscientious objector into an effective fighting man”).
9 For my own defense of religious freedom, and for some discussion of those messy and 
overlapping justifications, see Christopher C. Lund, Religion is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481 
(2017).
10 People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reprinted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THOMAS 
C. BERG & CHRISTOPHER C. LUND, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 94–99 (4th ed. 2016).
11 For a deeper analysis of Philips, see Walter J. Walsh, The First Free Exercise Case, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2004).
12 MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 96 (reprinting Philips).
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his will—such a thing, the court says, would “expose him to punishment in 
a future state [and to] privations and disgrace in this world.”13
This is our idea of broken conscience, although one can see how this 
label is imperfect. Forced to say what happened in that confessional, the 
priest will face “the compunctious visitings of a wounded conscience,” 
“disgrace in the presence of his assembled friends,” and “the gloomy 
perspective of a dreadful hereafter.”14 The first two of these can be seen in 
secular terms—as guilt and shame, respectively. But the third has a harder 
time being translated into secular terms. This illustrates a point probably
worth making. Harms can be phrased in secular terms—in the language of 
conscience—but this risks flattening the complex religious sentiments in 
play.
Bearing this in mind, examples of broken conscience are everywhere. 
One recent and illustrative case involved an Army Ranger who wanted to 
keep his hair long, maintain a beard, and wear a turban, all in accordance 
with the precepts of his Sikh faith.15 Years before, when the officer first 
started off as a cadet at West Point, “before [he] fully understood what was 
happening, he found himself in the barbershop with the other cadets to be 
trimmed and shaved.”16 He thought he would be kicked out of West Point 
if he objected, so he let it happen. Now, years later, he views that decision 
with profound regret. He went through a period of “significant shame and 
disappointment in himself,” he says, “for violating the Sikh religious 
requirements.”17 Such cases illustrate how martyrdom and broken 
conscience often go together: it is precisely that the Army Ranger feels like
he once abandoned his faith that makes him now unwilling to budge on 
matters relating to it.
II. MARTYRDOM AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Martyrdom and broken conscience each have their place, and their 
relative roles are probably impossible to pin down. But the idea of 
martyrdom—the prospect that religious folks will not back down from 
their religious commitments—has always been with us. American church-
state history is full of people who did not back down, even after it was 
clear what would happen to them if they persisted. Baptists were whipped 
                                                                                                                         
13 Id.
14 Id. The court goes on with this theme for some time, explaining how the priest’s testimony 
would work “an offence against high heaven, and seal his disgrace in the presence of his assembled 
friends, and to the affliction of a bereaved church and a weeping congregation.” Id.
15 Singh v. Carter, 168 F. Supp. 3d 216, 220 (D.D.C. 2016).
16 Complaint ¶¶ 71–72, Singh v. Carter, 168 F. Supp. 3d 216 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-399).
17 Id. ¶ 74; cf. Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A sincere religious 
believer doesn’t forfeit his religious rights merely because he is not scrupulous in his observance; for
where would religion be without its backsliders, penitents, and prodigal sons?”).
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and jailed in colonial Virginia for publishing religious sentiments and for 
preaching without a license; they knew the risks they were running.18
William Penn was given several chances to take his hat off; the judge held 
him in contempt only because he willfully refused to comply.19 In 1647, 
Massachusetts Bay banished Catholic priests from the colony, while also 
stipulating that any priest banished who came back would be put to death.20
. Defiance of the rules, even if it meant death, was something to be
expected.
Though it is impossible to establish this with any degree of confidence, 
one gets the vague sense that the prospect of martyrdom loomed larger in 
the minds of people centuries ago than it does today. Early American 
history is heavily influenced by the Christian tradition—a tradition in 
which martyrdom has had a very important role. Tertullian famously said 
that the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the church.21
And maybe martyrdom was just more expected in the old days. One 
wonderful case to teach is Commonwealth v. Cooke,22 a precursor to West 
Virginia v. Barnette.23 Thomas Wall, an 11-year-old Catholic student, was 
told by his public school teacher to read Protestant versions of the Lord’s 
Prayer and the Ten Commandments in the classroom. Wall’s priest had 
earlier told him to refuse.24 It was again the classic problem of two 
sovereigns (writ small), and Wall had to make his choice. Refusing the 
teacher’s order, he was beaten for thirty minutes with a cane. Wall thus 
became a martyr (again writ small), though his case actually combines 
                                                                                                                         
18 See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: 
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2165–66 (2003) (giving examples). And 
these events were influential. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 27, 
1774), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 104, 106 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal 
eds., 1962) (“That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution rages among some and to their 
eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their Quota of Imps for such business. This vexes me the most of 
any thing whatever. There are at this in the adjacent County not less than 5 or 6 well meaning men in 
close Goal for publishing their religious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox.”).
19 Michael McConnell notes how Penn’s case “became a cause célèbre in America,” and “came 
up for oblique discussion in the First Congress, during the debate over the Bill of Rights.” Michael W. 
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1409, 1472 & n.320 (1990).
20 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CATHOLIC HISTORY 111-12 (1962).
21 THE APOLOGY OF TERTULLIAN FOR THE CHRISTIANS 147 (T. Herbert Bindley trans., Parker & 
Co. 1890).
22 7 Am. L. Reg. 417 (Police Ct. 1859), as reprinted in MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 
456.
23 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
24 Michael Grossberg explains the backstory. In short, Boston required Bible reading in the public 
schools. But a compromise had been worked out in Catholic areas to allow Catholic texts to be used. 
When some school authorities went back on the compromise, many Catholic families and parishes 
objected, and Wall was thought to be an organizer and ringleader of local resistance.  For these details 
and more, see Michael Grossberg, Teaching the Republican Child: Three Antebellum Stories About 
Law, Schooling, and the Construction of American Families, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 429, 452–55 (1997).
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martyrdom with broken conscience. Wall had been beaten slowly in the 
hopes that he would back down. The court tells us that “[t]he blows were 
not given in quick succession, but with deliberation,” and “there were 
several intervals, at two of which [the teacher] was absent from the room 
some little time.”25 In the face of that force and determination, Wall 
eventually relented—he read what the teacher wanted, presumably in 
tears.26 And although the court says nothing about this, one cannot help but 
think about how Wall (like the Sikh Ranger)27 must have regretted backing 
down later.
At the time of the Framing, maybe the most salient issue regarding the
free exercise of religion involved Quakers and the draft. This came up in 
several places, among them in the First Congress’s consideration of the 
proposed amendment that “no person religiously scrupulous shall be 
compelled to bear arms.”28 That proposed amendment failed. And there is 
not even a real record of the failure because the Senate threw out the 
provision without recorded discussion.29 But in the House discussion, 
several members openly discussed the role of martyrdom: Quakers would 
never submit, so it would be pointless to draft them. Elias Boudinot put it 
squarely: “Can any dependence . . . be placed in men who are 
conscientious in this respect? [O]r what justice can there be in compelling 
them to bear arms, when, according to their religious principles, they 
would rather die than use them?”30 The fear was not that Quakers would 
comply at the cost of their consciences; the understanding was that they 
would not comply at all. From this, Roger Sherman concluded that it 
                                                                                                                         
25 See MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 456 (reprinting Cooke).
26 See Grossberg, supra note 24, at 455 (“Thomas held out for thirty minutes until, with cut and 
bleeding hands, he finally repeated the Commandments.”). This combination of sometimes backing 
down and sometimes remaining strong is common. Detlaf Garbe provides this account from a 
Jehovah’s Witness child in Nazi Germany:
When I refused to give the Hitler greeting, which was daily required at school, I 
would be struck, but I rejoiced to know, strengthened by my parents, that I had 
remained faithful. But there were times when either because of physical punishment 
or out of fear of the situation I would say “Heil Hitler.” I remember how I would 
then go home, my eyes filled with tears, and how we would pray together to Jehovah 
and how I would once again take courage to resist the enemy’s attacks the next time. 
Then the same thing would happen again.
DETLEF GARBE, BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND MARTYRDOM: JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES IN THE THIRD 
REICH 174 (Dagmar G. Grimm, trans., Univ. of Wis. Press 2008) (citation omitted).
27 See supra text accompanying notes 15–17 (discussing a Sikh Army Ranger who regretted 
allowing his hair to be cut at West Point).
28 For discussion of this provision, see McConnell, supra note 19, at 1500–03.
29 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 660 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[R]ecords of the debate in the Senate, which is where the conscientious-objector clause was removed, 
do not survive . . . .”).
30 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 767 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Boudinot, Aug. 
20, 1789).
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would not even make sense to require them to find substitutes or pay 
equivalents: “[T]hose who are religiously scrupulous of bearing arms . . .
are equally scrupulous of getting substitutes or paying an equivalent. Many 
of them would rather die than do either one or the other . . . .”31
The background here was that Quakers had long been martyrs for their 
faith on this point and everyone knew it. During the Revolution, 
Philadelphia had given a partial exemption to Quakers—they did not have 
to fight but they did have to pay an equivalent—and Quakers often 
responded with disobedience: “Quakers were fined for failing to pay taxes 
or equivalents, and substantial numbers had their property sold to pay the 
various sums they would not willingly turn over to the authorities.”32 But 
Quakers did not just refuse to kill for country. They often died refusing to 
protect themselves, which helped make their objection to war seem less 
self-serving. As Justice Scalia once put it: 
Quakers opposed the use of arms not just for militia service, 
but for any violent purpose whatsoever—so much so that 
Quaker frontiersmen were forbidden to use arms to defend 
their families, even though “[i]n such circumstances the 
temptation to seize a hunting rifle or knife in self-defense . . . 
must sometimes have been almost overwhelming.”33
It is hard to say whether martyrdom was more expected in the olden 
days. But here a trilogy of nineteenth century Mormon cases becomes 
tremendously important.34 These Mormon cases are well known in the 
field. But they deserve even more attention than people usually give them.
These cases have profoundly shaped how we view religious liberty in 
almost subconscious ways. Forget the opinions themselves; forget the 
legacy effects they have on modern doctrine (like Employment Division v. 
Smith35); forget even the background events that preceded them. Maybe the 
most important thing about the Mormon trilogy of cases is what happened 
after them. Because what happened after them—in particular, what 
happened almost exactly four months after the final opinion was issued—
has molded us in ways that we do not fully appreciate and sometimes do 
not even recognize.
                                                                                                                         
31 Id. at 750 (statement of Rep. Sherman, Aug. 17, 1789).
32 Philip Hamburger, Religious Freedom in Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603, 1628 (2005).
33 Heller, 554 U.S. at 590 (quoting PETER BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES 359 (1968)).
34 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 244 (1879); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Late 
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
35 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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The Mormon cases flow from the polygamy of the early Mormon 
church.36 Facing rejection from the rest of the country, the Mormons 
moved west under Brigham Young. This was an attempt at separation of 
church and state in a primal sense; the Mormons tried to separate church 
and state geographically. But it did not work; the Mormons could not get 
far enough away. Eventually Utah became a federal territory, and Congress 
began to step in to try and stop plural marriage.37 For a time, the Mormons 
survived by taking advantage of some natural advantages. Polygamy cases 
were hard to prove; witnesses refused to work with authorities; local 
officials declined to prosecute.38 But Congress was sufficiently determined, 
and so the cases ultimately came: (1) Reynolds v. United States, which 
upheld a bigamy conviction against constitutional challenge;39 (2) Davis v. 
Beason, which sustained a ban on polygamists voting;40 and (3) Late 
Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United 
States—the caption sums up both the case’s stakes and its holding—which 
validated Congress’s dissolution of the Mormon Church.41
For much of this period, Mormons refused to comply with the federal 
government’s antipolygamy efforts. Mormons would go into hiding or 
refuse to cooperate; they would lie or forget on the stand.42 Sometimes they 
would fight in a more literal sense, like the women who resisted arrest 
“with hatchet in hand.”43 This created, as such resistance always does, a 
kind of game of chicken. But the Mormons were up against a Congress and 
a country unwilling to swerve. As the decades went on, Congress passed 
progressively more ambitious legislation and Mormons began to go to jail 
in numbers for their faith. Scrutinizing the evidence over two decades, 
Sarah Barringer Gordon reports that more than half of the criminal records 
in Utah during this period were for unlawful cohabitation, with almost 900 
indictments between 1886 and 1888.44
The final straw, and the final case in the trilogy, happened in May 
1890. In Late Corporation, the Court upheld Congress’s decision to totally 
dissolve the Mormon Church and to confiscate its property.45 But just as 
important as what happened in May 1890 was what happened in 
                                                                                                                         
36 For some of the facts that follow and a wonderful overview of the subject, see SARAH 
BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002).
37 Id. at 55-83 (describing some of this legislation); MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 101–09 
(providing a brief overview of these developments).
38 GORDON, supra note 36, at 161–62.
39 98 U.S. at 251.
40 133 U.S. 333, 348 (1890).
41 136 U.S. 1, 46 (1890).
42 GORDON, supra note 36, at 158–59, 161 (2002).
43 Id. at 163.
44 Id. at 157–58.
45 136 U.S. at 66.
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September 1890. Four months after the decision in Late Corporation,
Wilford Woodruff, the president of the Church, made an announcement. It 
had been revealed to him that the Church should cease the practice of 
plural marriage. Now, this short window of time between legal decision 
and spiritual revelation suggests a cause-and-effect relationship, but 
Woodruff himself made that perfectly clear when he announced the 
change:
Inasmuch as laws have been enacted by Congress forbidding 
plural marriages, which laws have been pronounced 
constitutional by the court of last resort, I hereby declare my 
intention to submit to those laws, and to use my influence 
with the members of the Church over which I preside to have 
them do likewise.46
A year later, Woodruff added this in explanation:
The Lord has told me to ask the Latter-day Saints a 
question . . . . The question is this: Which is the wisest course 
for the Latter-day Saints to pursue—to continue to attempt to 
practice plural marriage, with the laws of the nation against it 
and the opposition of sixty millions of people, and at the cost 
of the confiscation and loss of all the Temples, and the 
stopping of all the ordinances therein, both for the living and 
the dead, and the imprisonment of the First Presidency and 
Twelve and the heads of families in the Church, and the 
confiscation of personal property of the people (all of which 
of themselves would stop the practice); or, after doing and 
suffering what we have through our adherence to this 
principle to cease the practice and submit to the law, and 
through doing so leave the Prophets, Apostles and fathers at 
home, so that they can instruct the people and attend to the 
duties of the Church, and also leave the Temples in the hands 
of the Saints, so that they can attend to the ordinances of the 
Gospel, both for the living and the dead?47
This logic is easy to follow; even children can follow the basic idea of 
duress. If the two alternatives for the Mormon Church in 1890 were to 
abandon polygamy or die, is death really the only true option? Religions, 
like constitutions, need not be suicide pacts.
                                                                                                                         
46 Wilford Woodruff, Official Declaration 1, THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS (Sept. 24, 1890), https://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/od/1 [https://perma.cc/44A2-
T23Z].
47 Wilford Woodruff, President, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Address at the 
Cache Stake Conference (Nov. 1, 1891), https://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/od/1
[https://perma.cc/ 44A2-T23Z].
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But it is important to also see this from a religious perspective, as 
Woodruff himself did. Maybe the faithful thing for the Mormon church—
maybe the thing God wants—is to abandon plural marriage. This is, in fact, 
what Woodruff says: If the alternatives are the abandonment of plural 
marriage and the destruction of God’s church—a church that is the light 
and future of the world—God’s will must be for the former. Woodruff 
would have known the line about the Sabbath being made for man and not 
man for the Sabbath, and Woodruff would have seen polygamy along the 
same lines.48
To those who see martyrdom as essential or inherent in religion,49 this 
may sound like a weak response to be expected only from people 
insufficiently committed to the faith.50 But the religious logic in 
Woodruff’s position holds. And there is also here a distinction between 
individual and corporate martyrdom that sometimes gets lost. It is one 
thing to die yourself for your faith; it is another thing to commit someone 
else. And there is also the question of whether martyrdom will really work 
anyway. Think about Woodruff again—or think about the mandate from
John Garvey’s position. If it would solve the problem that Catholic 
University faced, Garvey might decide to go to jail for the rest of his life or 
suffer personal bankruptcy. But liability for the mandate is corporate and 
not personal. No amount of time that Garvey spends in jail for contempt 
will save Catholic University. There is nothing he can do. Woodruff was in 
the same position.
Woodruff applied a straightforward conception of duress: when 
religious obligation conflicts with legal obligation, religious obligation 
bends to avert the conflict. In this way, religious duress is a kind of mirror 
image of religious exemption—religious exemptions involve precisely the 
                                                                                                                         
48 In a thoughtful and striking piece, Frederick Gedicks defends Woodruff’s position: “Mormons 
understand their church to exist in the world to do God’s work, and the church clearly cannot do God’s
work unless it exists in the world . . . . From the perspective of the nineteenth-century church, there
were aspects of Mormonism which were more important than plural marriage, and it became clear to 
the leaders of the church at that time that it was necessary to choose between them.” Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to Stanley Hauerwas, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 167, 
172 (1992). For a quite different approach, see Stanley Hauerwas & Michael Baxter, The Kingship of 
Christ: Why Freedom of “Belief” is Not Enough, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 125 (1992).
49 See Mark Tushnet, In Praise of Martyrdom?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1999) (“A person 
who truly believes cannot—simply cannot—be induced to change his or her beliefs.”); Hauerwas & 
Baxter, supra note 48, at 126–27 (similar). But see Paul Horwitz, Against Martyrdom: A Liberal 
Argument for Accommodation of Religion, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1301, 1330 (2016) (arguing that 
“Tushnet’s account of religious belief and its relationship with the world . . . is . . . based too much on a 
theology that assumes God is done speaking” and that religious groups are constantly refining their 
beliefs in ways that can appear from the outside as changes).
50 See Mark Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion Thirty Years On, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 
25 n.125 (2015) (“[T]he general view held by non-Mormons of the Mormon abandonment of the 
practice of polygamy . . . [is] the cynical view that these changes are insincere capitulations to external 
pressure.”).
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same conflict but with legal obligation doing the bending. Yet here is the 
knot. Knowing better than to require the impossible, religions often have 
some conception of religious duress.51 But such conceptions must prompt 
us to reconsider the whole issue of exemptions. In the aftermath of the 
Manifesto, Woodruff remarked: “[W]e have carried [God’s 
commandments] as far as we could; but when we cannot do it, we are 
justified. The Lord does not require at our hands things we cannot do.”52
What could please a government more than a statement like that? This 
neatly solves the problem of two masters, doesn’t it? If the Kosher rules 
allow Jews to eat non-Kosher food when no Kosher food is available, why 
again should a state prison provide Kosher meals? The denial of an 
accommodation itself becomes an accommodation; the state erases the 
religious obligation by refusing to cater to it.
The Mormon episode teaches a number of lessons about religious 
exemptions. But maybe the big lesson is this: don’t make exemptions. If 
you make exemptions, you will have to keep on making exemptions and 
you will never get what you want. But if you don’t make exemptions, those 
religious folks will back down. They might martyr themselves in the short 
term, which will be hard for them and frustrating for you. But eventually 
they will come along. With enough pressure and enough time, you can get 
them to change their minds even about theology. And then everyone wins:
you get what you want, and they will be satisfied with the new theology 
that they forget you had a role in creating.
This is all tongue-in-cheek, of course, but it is worth asking why we 
shouldn’t view the Mormon cases this way. Don’t they end happily 
enough? The Mormon church abandons polygamy in 1890. By 1894, every 
repentant polygamist is pardoned.53 By 1896, all the church property is
returned.54 That is a swift and relatively peaceable end to a very long
conflict.55 Paul Horwitz has thoughtfully pointed out how it can go the 
other way too—church-state conflicts can sometimes act to solidify, unify, 
and galvanize religious groups in their opposition to the state.56 And there 
are traces of Horwitz’s logic in the Mormon story too. When Congress first 
                                                                                                                         
51 For one example, see CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH pt. 3, art. 8(IV), ¶ 1859 (2003), 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P6C.HTM [https://perma.cc/AMG9-YYGN] (“Mortal sin 
requires full knowledge and complete consent . . . [which] implies a consent sufficiently deliberate to 
be a personal choice.”).
52 Gedicks, supra note 48, at 171 (footnote omitted).
53 See Proclamation No. 369 (Sept. 25, 1894), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=70911 [https://perma.cc/ZBQ3-4FSK].
54 See Edwin B. Firmage, Free Exercise of Religion in Nineteenth Century America: The Mormon 
Cases, 7 J.L. & RELIG. 281, 312 (1989).
55 See Gedicks, supra note 48, at 169 n.6 (“[P]ersecution ceased almost immediately upon the 
Mormons’ abandonment of plural marriage.”).
56 See Horwitz, supra note 49, at 1320 (“[I]lliberal religious groups—like other groups—harden 
as well as soften, snap as well as bend, react as well as give.”).
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began acting against polygamy, it actually strengthened Mormon 
commitment to the practice.57 Horwitz’s point is that religious freedom can 
help contain and reduce illiberalism within religious groups, and he must 
be right at least sometimes. But this ends up yet another disturbing aspect 
of the Mormon cases. The conflict with the Mormon Church lasted decades 
and only ended when Congress finally brought in the overwhelming 
firepower necessary to win. Might the deep lesson be that the state needs to 
stop thinking in terms of half-measures and just dial up the persecution to 
eleven right from the start?58
The Mormon cases are ingrained in our consciousness; they are a core 
part of our national experience with religion. They are the earliest cases 
where the Supreme Court wrestles with the idea of religious exemptions—
the only such cases from the nineteenth century, in fact. And they have 
some doctrinal weight even now; Employment Division v. Smith took them 
as having established a rule from which the Court has never deviated.59
The Mormon cases have become a kind of dominant narrative, and it is 
unfortunate that other narratives have gotten less attention. Contrast the 
experience of the late-nineteenth century Mormons with the mid-twentieth 
century Jehovah’s Witnesses. In World War II, five thousand Jehovah’s 
Witnesses spent time in prison in America for refusing both the draft and 
alternative service.60 Meanwhile, somewhere between a third to half of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Germany were either imprisoned, executed, or sent 
to concentration camps.61 And the striking thing is that Jehovah’s 
Witnesses—unlike other objects of Nazi persecution like the Jews—had 
the ability to stop the forces against them by signing a simple form 
                                                                                                                         
57 GORDON, supra note 36, at 87.
58 In a set of interesting papers, Netta Barak-Corren has begun exploring these matters 
empirically. In one study, for example, she asked principals of conservative religious schools how they 
would handle a teacher who had gotten pregnant out of wedlock. Netta Barak-Corren, Does 
Antidiscrimination Law Influence Religious Behavior? An Empirical Examination, 67 HASTINGS L.J.
957, 978, 989–91 (2016). She found that legal outcomes and the kinds of legal remedies imposed had 
significant though complicated effects on religious decision-making. Id. at 1019. See also Netta Barak-
Corren, Beyond Dissent and Compliance: Religious Decision Makers and Secular Law, 6 OXFORD J.L.
& RELIG. 293, 294–95 (2017).
59 See 494 U.S. 872, 878–82 (1990) (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs 
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to 
regulate. . . . We first had occasion to assert that principle in Reynolds v. United States . . . [and] the 
rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds plainly controls [this case].” (citation omitted)).
60 Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29 (1990) (citing 
MULFORD Q. SIBLEY & PHILIP E. JACOB, CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE: THE AMERICAN STATE AND 
THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR, 1940–1947, at 34, 83–84, 355–58 (1952)); see also M. JAMES 
PENTON, APOCALYPSE DELAYED 142–43 (2d ed. 1997).
61 See DETLEF GARBE, BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND MARTYRDOM: JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES IN THE 
THIRD REICH 484 (2008) (summarizing and scrutinizing a number of academic works, concluding that 
there were between “25,000 and 30,000 [Jehovah’s Witnesses]” and “[t]en thousand of [them] were 
imprisoned for various periods of time”).
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renouncing their faith. (Few did.62) But only in this way can we understand 
the otherwise bewildering remark by the director of the Research Institute 
at the United States Holocaust Museum: “The Jehovah’s Witnesses were 
literally the only martyrs of the Holocaust.”63
If the lesson of the Mormons is that sometimes religious people will 
back down, the lesson of the Jehovah’s Witnesses is that sometimes they 
won’t. But many people know the Mormon experience; fewer know about 
the Witnesses’. Most church-state classes cover the Mormon era in some 
detail; my sense is that most do not even mention the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
in World War II. Perhaps this is because most law school classes tend to 
revolve around Supreme Court cases—although there are actually some 
Supreme Court cases tangentially bearing on this issue.64
This theme of martyrdom runs through the entire Jehovah’s Witness 
experience. Take, for example, their refusal of blood transfusions. Often 
such refusals happen outside of any legal context—no legal issue 
necessarily arises simply because a Jehovah’s Witness refuses a 
transfusion and then dies a preventable death. But occasionally that 
suffering intersects with law, and then one can see notions of martyrdom 
quite clearly.
A case out of Kansas involves martyrdom in the literal sense. Mary 
Stinemetz was a Jehovah’s Witness on Medicaid who needed a liver 
transplant.65 Ordinary liver transplants require blood transfusions. But in 
Nebraska, they were now doing bloodless liver transplants—transplants, 
amazingly enough, without transfusions. Yet Kansas refused to pay for 
                                                                                                                         
62 Detlef Garbe explains how, early on, some Witnesses were willing to sign statements 
guaranteeing them release. But those early statements required Witnesses only to pledge future good 
behavior; they did not require a renunciation of the faith. When later statements required a clear and 
unambiguous renunciation of the faith, “extremely low numbers” of Jehovah’s Witnesses signed them. 
Id. at 287. This, of course, baffled the Nazis: “How could somebody who is given the opportunity to be 
released choose to go to a concentration camp?” Id. at 291. 
63 See Joel P. Engardio, Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Untold Story of Resistance to Nazis, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR (Nov. 6, 1996) (“Unlike Jews and others targeted by the Nazis, the Witnesses were 
prisoners of conscience. They could have bought freedom by signing a declaration card that renounced 
their faith and pledged allegiance to Hitler. Few took the offer.”).
64 In Cox v. United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947), the Supreme Court ruled 5–4 against several 
Jehovah’s Witnesses seeking to be considered ministers within the meaning of the World War II draft 
exemption. Cox is particularly interesting now after the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171 (2012). Hosanna-Tabor and Cox involve quite different contexts, of course, but both 
cases address the scope and justifications of a ministerial exception. Various comparisons and contrasts 
come to mind. To take one example, Cox and Hosanna-Tabor have different takes on the relevance of 
the time someone spends on religious activities. Compare Cox, 332 U.S. at 451 (“The documents show 
that Thompson and Roisum spent only a small portion of their time in religious activities, and this fact 
alone . . . is sufficient for the board to deny them a minister’s classification.”), with Hosanna-Tabor,
565 U.S. at 194 (“The amount of time an employee spends on particular activities is relevant in 
assessing that employee’s status, but that factor cannot be considered in isolation, without regard to the 
nature of the religious functions performed and the other considerations discussed above.”).
65 Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Policy Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 143 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). 
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such a procedure for Stinemetz, because Kansas had a policy of only 
reimbursing in-state procedures.66 Kansas probably thought Mary 
Stinemetz would back down. Surely, if push came to shove, she would 
choose the regular liver transplant over dying. But that is not what 
happened. Instead Mary Stinemetz died—a martyr for her faith in twenty-
first century America.
An equally dramatic case involving Jehovah’s Witnesses and blood 
transfusions comes out of Mississippi. Mattie Brown was a Jehovah’s 
Witness who had been shot by her daughter. The state knew that Brown 
was a Jehovah’s Witness and that she would refuse a blood transfusion. 
Worried that Brown would die and thus deprive it of a valuable witness, 
the state went to court and got an order forcing a blood transfusion on her 
over her objections.67 The Mississippi Supreme Court eventually found 
that order unconstitutional, but it was too late—the surgery (and the 
transfusion) had already happened. And so Mattie Brown had to live with 
the contamination of her body and the possible loss of her salvation.
Some think there are changes afoot in American religion—that religion 
in the United States is becoming less of a durable commitment and more of 
a lifestyle.68 People have more choice in their religious faiths and more 
consciously experience their religious faiths as chosen. But however true 
this may be, there are still millions of Americans who are resolute in their 
faiths. And one cannot help but wonder whether, in some deep way, the 
law is responsive to that. When one looks at cases involving Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and blood transfusions as they arise in various contexts, one sees 
judges taking inordinate care to protect the religious beliefs in question.69
In the Stinemetz case, for example, the Kansas court was in no way bound 
to give a religious exemption. That court essentially created a right of 
religious exemption through a bold reinterpretation of its state constitution.
                                                                                                                         
66 And this came despite the fact that bloodless liver transplants actually cost less than regular 
ones, so an exception for Stinemetz here would have actually saved Kansas money. See id. at 155 (“[I]t 
appears that the bloodless technique for a liver transplant is less expensive than a procedure involving 
blood transfusions, which the KHPA is willing to fund. Thus, the KHPA is unable to argue that the 
agency is being fiscally responsible as the steward of Kansas tax dollars by denying Stinemetz’ request 
for prior authorization for the bloodless liver transplant.”).
67 In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Miss. 1985).
68 This is a theme of ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION: HOW WE
ACTUALLY LIVE OUR FAITH (2003). For some thoughtful reflections on Wolfe’s book in contexts close 
to ours, see Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State’s Interest in the Development 
of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645, 1660–69 (2004).
69 For an analysis of this, see Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities,
53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 166–67, 169, 171–73 (2016) (discussing various instances involving 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in various postures).
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It ratcheted up the standard of review because it could and because there 
was a result it believed justice clearly demanded.70
Martyrs are frustrating people to deal with—they are “prickly people,” 
as Tom Berg has put it.71 There is an understandable temptation to shout at 
William Penn that it is just a hat; he need not go to jail for this. Cases 
frequently involve religious practices that are meaningless outside the 
faith, often even unnoticeable to the rest of us. We think of how we wear 
our hair and whether we wear a scarf as fashion choices; some of us loathe 
them accordingly. But there are people who will not compromise on such 
matters and will lose everything to follow the dictates of conscience. 
One striking case involved a Native American kindergartner whose 
family had recently moved to Needville, Texas.72 The family asked the 
school district to let the boy wear his hair long, in accordance with 
religious beliefs of their Apache tribe. The school refused, insisting that 
only girls could have long hair. But perhaps the most arresting thing about 
the case is the family’s commitment. The boy had never cut his hair and 
the boy’s father had not cut his hair in ten years. The father was threatened 
with the loss of his job unless he cut his hair; he refused to cut his hair. The 
father was told to cut his hair for brain surgery; he still refused to cut his 
hair. Faced with all this, the Fifth Circuit treated this as an easy case: 
“Superintendent Rhodes’s concern for aesthetic homogeneity . . . is 
insufficiently compelling to overtake the sincere exercise of religious 
belief.”73
If judges can be influenced by notions of martyrdom, legislatures can 
as well. Legislatures sometimes make religious exemptions, and certain 
classes of legislative exemptions make sense mostly if martyrdom (and the 
prospect of martyrdom) is taken as a primary rationale. If religious 
believers in question will violate the law in question and endure the 
assigned punishment, that becomes a reason why a legislature might 
exempt them ex ante. In such cases, the state is essentially backing down—
recognizing that for all its powers, the state has limited ability to command 
obedience and that sometimes it may not be worth punishing 
disobedience.74
                                                                                                                         
70 Later the Kansas legislature passed its state RFRA, statutorily codifying the holding in 
Stinemetz. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5301–5305 (2013) (describing the provisions of the state 
RFRA).
71 See Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
41, 70 (2003) (“In matters of religious liberty, we must give substantial attention to the prickly people; 
it is their rights that are most often at stake.”).
72 For the case and the facts that follow, see A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 251–58 (5th Cir. 2010).
73 Id. at 271.
74 See Mark Tushnet, In Praise of Martyrdom?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1123 (1999) (“[Such acts 
of defiance] put the question to the State: What do you truly want to do?”).
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Exemptions from the draft, previously discussed in this Essay, may be 
the best example. Quakers paid fines for resisting the draft in the 
eighteenth century and Jehovah’s Witnesses went to prison for resisting the 
draft in the twentieth.75 Even if a legislature had no sympathy for the 
religious beliefs or groups in question, draft exemptions could make sense 
as a way of dealing with the sheer fact of noncompliance.
Another area where (for good reason) there is little sympathy with the 
religious belief in question is with religious exemptions to child abuse and 
neglect laws. These religious exemptions come not from courts but from 
legislatures, who have sometimes protected religious parents who forego 
medical treatment for their children for religious reasons. The details of 
these exemption schemes vary considerably. Some states immunize 
religious folks from civil claims of child neglect; some immunize them 
from criminal claims of abuse and neglect; a few even immunize them 
from charges of homicide.76 The background here is that a number of 
faiths, often insular Christian communities, believe in the avoidance of 
modern medicine as a matter of faith.
These exemptions are striking. The life of a child is a compelling 
governmental interest, if anything is. If ever there were a place where the 
law should override religious judgments, this would be it.77 These 
exemptions thus seem not only indefensible but incomprehensible. There is 
no conceivable rationale for letting children die when they could be saved.
But of course, this is where notions of martyrdom come in.78 What if the 
religious parents in these cases will not back down? What if there is 
nothing the state can do to make them change their minds? After all, if 
parents are willing to stomach the possible death of their child, and all that
comes with that, no threat the state will impose is likely to matter all that 
much.
The cases here are hard to read. But take the case of the Schaibles, a 
faith-healing family from Pennsylvania who rejected medical care on 
                                                                                                                         
75 See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
76 Walter H. Hawes IV, Faith-Healing Prosecutions: How Religious Parents Are Treated 
Unfairly by Laws That Protect Their Liberty, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 885, 893–94 & nn.56–57 (2017); 
MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 64 (2d ed. 
2014); Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2007).
77 Most will agree with this: “Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not 
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have 
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.” Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
78 This is not to say that this was the original rationale for these legislative exemptions. For an 
overview of that quite path-dependent history, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Religion 
Is Not a Basis for Harming Others, 104 GEO. L.J. 1111, 1125–26 & nn.115–23 (2016) (reviewing 
PAUL A. OFFIT, BAD FAITH: WHEN RELIGIOUS BELIEF UNDERMINES MODERN MEDICINE (2015)).
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religious principle.79 They lost their two-year-old son, Kent, to treatable 
pneumonia. Convicted of involuntary manslaughter, they were sentenced 
to ten years of probation. Years later, the Schaibles had another child, 
Brandon, who was eight months old when he came down with pneumonia. 
The situation must have felt eerily familiar to them. Again they did not see 
a doctor and Brandon too ended up dying—a second child lost to perfectly 
treatable pneumonia. One gets a sense that the deterrent functions of the 
law simply do not operate here: If Kent’s death, and the prospect of 
Brandon’s death, are not enough to make the parents take Brandon to see a 
doctor, what can the law do? The law seems anemic in comparison to the 
powers with which we are now dealing.
We can put the Schaibles in jail; we probably should. But still we must 
ask what good will be served by doing so. The children are dead. Jail is not 
going to deter the Schaibles. Maybe jail for the Schaibles would help deter 
the less committed members of their religious community, although those 
folks will be the ones least in need of deterrence—they would be the ones 
already likely to turn tail and go see a doctor if their children became 
seriously ill. There is still the simple retributive case, of course. But even 
this gets complicated, because conceptions of blameworthiness get 
complicated. Reading these cases is like reading cases about criminally 
insane defendants; the more you read, the harder it becomes to judge the 
defendants because they do not seem like they are from this world.
Perhaps the Schaibles should lose custody of their remaining children.
There is a sense to this too, though it is different than saying the Schaibles 
should be thrown in jail. Taking away custody is prospective and 
preventative; jail is retrospective and punitive. But even the custodial 
question gets tricky, because such arguments are so obviously elastic—
they would support the state preemptively taking away all the children of 
every faith-healing family at birth.
One sees some of these points in State v. Hickman, a recent Oregon 
case involving a family belonging to the Followers of Christ.80 The parents 
were sentenced to six years in prison on manslaughter charges relating to 
the death of their newborn, David. Shannon Hickman had gone into labor 
two months early. Some people do home births nowadays, but no one 
would do that with a baby two months premature. Yet Shannon went to her 
parents’ house for the delivery, as her religion taught. And she stayed 
there, even after the newborn refused to eat, even after his breathing 
became labored, and even after he changed color from pink to blue-and-
gray. The facts of this case are visceral and painful; suffice it to say that the 
baby died from sepsis nine hours after birth. Of course these parents are 
                                                                                                                         
79 For this case and the facts that follow, see Commonwealth v. Schaible, No. 1003 EDA 2014, 
2014 WL 10584785 at *1–*2, *4–*7 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2014).
80 For the case and the facts that follow, see State v. Hickman, 358 P.3d 987, 988–91 (Or. 2015).
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blameworthy in every usual sense of the term: All of these problems would 
have been handled if the child had been born in a hospital or sent to the 
hospital shortly after birth.81 But at the same time, the reader here feels not 
only anger at the parents, but also confusion, sadness, and despair. Try as 
one might to deny it, the Hickmans here did what they earnestly thought 
best for their child. And even after their child’s death—a child they 
loved—the two parents still believed that what they did was right: “Both of 
them testified that, looking back on David’s death, they would not have 
done anything differently.”82 In the second Schaible case, where the 
parents were sentenced to three-and-a-half to seven years in prison, the 
trial judge described them as “loving and caring parents, with the 
significant exception of their absurd and dangerous views on medical care 
for their children.”83
This is martyrdom. The law can punish disobedience after the fact, and 
it can try to circumvent the possibility of disobedience (by, for example, 
preemptively taking away custody). But it has a hard time coercing 
obedience before the fact. This is not to say that the Schaibles and 
Hickmans of the world have suffered enough. Maybe they haven’t. But 
despite the obvious retributive case, the question lingers—what is there is 
to be gained by imprisoning a couple who have lost their children?  
Of course, these cases simultaneously push in the other direction as 
well. All this discussion of martyrdom can illustrate how the whole 
concept of religious accommodation can seem wrong-headed, dangerous, 
and borderline insane. In these cases, the state and a religious believer are 
trapped in a game of chicken, so to speak. Both sides say the same thing: 
Sometimes we will back down and sometimes we won’t. Sometimes we 
will back down because we suspect you won’t. But on some things, we 
will refuse to back down. And you can’t know in advance which things 
those are. 
In such situations, why should the state be the one to swerve? Does it 
not send a terrible message—that rather than expecting private citizens to 
back down, the state will itself back down? And does it not set a terrible 
precedent—by suggesting that the state will back down when faced with 
                                                                                                                         
81 Striking is this passage:
If defendants had called 9–1–1 at the moment that David was born, when they 
noticed that he was born prematurely, medical professionals immediately would 
have been able to give David antibiotics to ward off any infection resulting from 
Shannon’s chorioamnionitis; to monitor and regulate David’s temperature and 
breathing; and to feed David intravenously. If David had received that treatment, 
one doctor estimated that David would have had a 99 percent chance of survival.
Id. at 990.
82 Id. at 991.
83 Schaible, 2014 WL 10584785, at *8.
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disobedience, does it not encourage such disobedience? Any game theorist 
would tell you what the state needs to do. The state needs to credibly and 
irrevocably precommit to not making exemptions. But this runs 
problematically into the prevenient nature of religious beliefs. The 
religious believers in these cases already have precommitted to their 
course of action. The state finds itself the last party to act, which is 
intolerable in games of chicken.
III. MARTYRDOM IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE
All these ideas—about whether religious believers will back down or 
not, about the relative theoretical roles of the rationales of martyrdom and 
broken conscience—would be interesting even if they had nothing to do 
with the doctrine or theory of religious freedom. But they do have 
something to do with the doctrine and theory of religious freedom.
To start with theory, some of the most influential and persuasive 
accounts of religious accommodations speak in terms of incentives. Take 
Douglas Laycock’s notion of substantive neutrality, under which “the 
religion clauses require government to minimize the extent to which it 
either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or 
nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.”84 This is about incentives: 
government should not be pressuring people on religious matters, in any 
direction. But if you think about this for more than a second, it raises a 
query. If exemptions are about relieving religious pressure, what about 
those who experience no pressure? Martyrs—those truly committed to the 
faith—are not going to change their ways for want of a religious 
exemption. Does that mean we have less reason to give exemptions to such 
folks?
It is easy to brush off such ideas as silly and beside the point. But 
before doing that, consider the Supreme Court decision that has led lower 
courts down precisely this kind of path: Thomas v. Review Board.85 Chief 
Justice Burger surely had his virtues. But he really did a number on First 
Amendment doctrines, at least in the area of the Religion Clauses. 
Conservatives usually start with his opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman,86
criticizing it for the doctrine it created.87 Liberals usually start with his 
                                                                                                                         
84 Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990). Michael McConnell and Richard Posner developed similar ideas 
under the label of “incentive neutrality.” See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 (1989) (“The purpose of 
the Free Exercise Clause, in this view, is to remove governmental disincentives to religious choice.”).
85 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
86 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
87 The classic line is still Justice Scalia’s: “Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that 
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school 
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opinion in Marsh v. Chambers,88 criticizing it for the doctrine it ignored—
namely Lemon, which, again, Burger had written.89
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in Thomas v. Review Board has 
attracted less notice, but it too has its issues. Thomas involved a Jehovah’s 
Witness who worked at a foundry fabricating sheet steel.90 When the 
foundry closed, he was transferred to a department that made tank turrets.
But Thomas was a pacifist, and he refused to make tank turrets. So he quit 
his job. Earlier cases had held that religious objectors had to be given 
unemployment benefits in such circumstances.91 But the Indiana courts
denied Thomas benefits because they deemed his objections too 
inconsistent to count as genuinely religious.92 Other Jehovah’s Witnesses 
were willing to make tank turrets, and Thomas himself had proved willing 
to make sheet steel (some of which would later be used for tank turrets). 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled for Thomas in an eight to one
decision.
Usually when Thomas is taught, it is for some now-uncontroversial 
premises. Courts generally should not investigate whether a person’s 
beliefs are internally consistent or whether they are consistent with the 
beliefs of their co-religionists. But Thomas also contains a curious passage 
about burdens. Sherbert had held the denial of unemployment benefits 
counted as a burden for Free Exercise purposes.93 That logic was akin to 
the logic of Laycock’s notion of substantive neutrality: just as much as a 
civil fine or criminal penalty, the loss of unemployment benefits can 
pressure people away from their religious commitments. In Thomas,
Justice Burger quotes the relevant passages from Sherbert, but then adds 
this:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit 
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it 
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by 
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an 
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a 
burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be 
                                                                                                                         
attorneys . . . .” Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring).
88 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
89 See id. at 800–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I have no doubt that, if any group of law students 
were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they would nearly 
unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.”).
90 For the facts that follow, see Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710–13.
91 E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399, 401–02 (1963).
92 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713–15 (referring to Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 391 
N.E.2d 1127 (1979)).
93 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless 
substantial.94
Sherbert had created a categorical rule that the loss of government 
benefits was a burden. And in defending that rule, the Court spoke of the 
religious pressure that such losses can create.95 But Thomas could be read 
to suggest something slightly different—namely, that the loss of 
government benefits should count as a burden only when it creates 
religious pressure in the individual case. When Thomas speaks of 
“important benefit[s],” it leaves the reader to wonder what benefits might 
not be sufficiently important. When Thomas speaks of “substantial 
pressure,” the reader wonders what amounts of pressure might be 
constitutionally insufficient.
To be sure, Burger probably did not mean to create doctrine here at all. 
He probably just meant to repeat what Sherbert said and put it in his own 
words. But his addition of gratuitous adjectives (“important” and 
“substantial”) confuses the matter and threatens to make new requirements 
from old cases. 
To be sure, Thomas should not be read this way. The idea that a burden 
exists only when there is “substantial pressure” in some individual case, 
cannot square with the Supreme Court’s other cases. The Court in 
Sherbert, for example, did not care how much religious pressure Adele 
Sherbert actually experienced—it did not talk about how much in 
unemployment benefits she received, or how much money she had, or how 
committed she was to her faith. Sherbert created a categorical rule: if the 
government requires you on pain of penalty to do something your religion 
forbids, or forbids something your religion requires, that is a burden on 
religious exercise.96
Yet if one took this possibility from Thomas seriously, it would be a 
different way of approaching free exercise cases. In each individual case, 
the judge would try to discern how much religious pressure would be 
created by the denial of an exemption. Only in cases of significant pressure 
would exemptions be appropriate. In this way, religious exemptions would 
                                                                                                                         
94 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717–18.
95 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (“[T]o condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant’s 
willingness to violate a cardinal principal of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of 
her constitutional liberties.”).
96 See discussion supra note 95 and accompanying text regarding Sherbert. In the Supreme 
Court’s recent case involving a Muslim prisoner seeking to wear a beard, the state memorably told him: 
“You will abide by [Arkansas Department of Correction] policies and if you choose to disobey, you can 
suffer the consequences.” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 861 (2015). The Court’s opinion concludes 
this is a substantial burden, but the opinion never explains what “suffer the consequences” actually 
means. The Court simply moves on to the next issue. See id. at 861–63.
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be reserved for non-martyrs. After all, if exemptions are designed to 
relieve religious pressure, true martyrs will not need them.97
This would be a radical and fascinating change in the doctrine. It 
would mean, for example, there was no burden in the Stinemetz case—the
Kansas case involving a Jehovah’s Witness on Medicaid who needed a 
liver transplant but objected to a blood transfusion. The religious 
exemption made a lot of sense—it cost the state less money and saved a 
human being’s life.98 But under this conception of Thomas, Stinemetz 
could not even claim to be burdened by Kansas’s denial, because, in 
Thomas’ terms, she would not have felt any “substantial pressure” to 
“modify [her] behavior” or “violate [her] beliefs.”99 Mary Stinemetz was 
never going to back down, no matter what.
Yet an even better example of the strangeness of this logic comes from 
a case where it was adopted.100 Jason Heap was an applicant for a Navy 
Chaplaincy. Things looked good for Heap; he had studied theology at 
Oxford and got a perfect score in the personal interview. But eventually it 
came out that Heap wanted to be a Humanist chaplain, and that pretty 
much doomed his chances. He brought a straightforward claim of religious 
discrimination, which seemed quite plausible.
Yet the district court denied Heap’s claims on the startling theory—
taken from Burger’s opinion in Thomas—that even if Heap’s claim of 
discrimination was factually correct and legally cognizable, his claim still 
failed because the burden on him was insufficient. Here is the court’s 
logic:
Here, Dr. Heap has not shown that becoming a Humanist 
Navy chaplain is dictated by the tenets of Humanism or that 
by not becoming a Navy chaplain he is somehow in violation 
of the tenets of Humanism. Rejecting Heap from the Navy 
chaplaincy does not put substantial pressure on Dr. Heap to 
modify his behavior and violate his beliefs.101
This logic is counterintuitive; it may take a few readings to follow it. 
But the essence is simply this: Heap is such a committed Humanist that he 
won’t abandon his Humanist convictions simply because we don’t give 
                                                                                                                         
97 In Thomas’ terms, because a “burden upon religion exists” only when there is “substantial 
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,” a true martyr will never be 
burdened. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717–18.
98 See supra notes 65–65 and accompanying text summarizing the Stinemetz case.
99 See Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Policy Auth., 252 P.3d 141, 147 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining 
that Stinemetz would have refused to accept a blood transfusion “even in a life-threatening situation”).
100 See Heap v. Carter, 112 F. Supp. 3d 402 (E.D. Va. 2015). For more on the facts of this case, 
see id. at 409–11.
101 Id. at 422.
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him a job, so there’s no substantial burden on his religious beliefs when we 
don’t give him that job.
This logic is unlikely to persuade people, in part because of its raw 
unfairness and in part because it does not fit with anything else the Court 
has ever done. It is inconsistent with Sherbert and other recent cases. It 
would be like saying, in McDaniel v. Paty, that states could exclude 
ministers from serving in the constitutional convention because no one 
would abandon the ministry over such a small thing.102
Yet these arguments keep resurfacing. They did so, for example, last 
term in the Supreme Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran.103 Trinity 
Lutheran involved a Missouri program that gave money to resurface school 
playgrounds, but categorically excluded religious schools from 
participating. One of the state’s arguments was that the denial of funds was 
insufficient to amount to a burden on religious exercise, because it was too 
insignificant to create any religious pressure on the school.104 The Court 
never mentioned the argument.
What makes this argument so interesting, of course, is how it inverts 
traditional understandings regarding martyrdom. It says the weak (those 
susceptible to religious pressure) should get exemptions and the strong 
(those not so susceptible) should not. But our earlier discussion of 
martyrdom imagined it precisely the other way: giving exemptions to the 
strong (those who will not back down) but not the weak (those who will).
And there is, in fact, an area of law that does exactly the latter—an 
area of law where judges make predictive judgments about who will 
comply, and where the law exempts those that it decides will not comply. 
This is the realm of civil contempt. The classic paradigm case here works 
well for us. Take a reporter who refuses to turn over her sources despite a 
valid subpoena. Black-letter law says that the reporter should be 
incarcerated to get the reporter to comply with the court’s order. But the 
black-letter law also makes an exception. If it becomes sufficiently clear 
that the reporter will not comply, civil contempt becomes inappropriate 
and the reporter must be released.105 Of course, the judge does not simply 
                                                                                                                         
102 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628–29 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a provision of 
the Tennessee Constitution that barred ministers from serving as delegates in the state constitutional 
convention).
103 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
104 This is how Missouri proposed to distinguish Locke v. Davey: “A state’s refusal to support an 
aspiring pastor’s religious education surely exerts a greater pressure on free religious exercise than does 
a state’s refusal to subsidize a church daycare’s secular capital improvement project.” Brief for 
Respondent at *21, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (No. 
15-577), 2016 WL 3548944, at *21. Missouri also quoted the familiar passage from Thomas quoted in 
the text about how there needed to be “substantial pressure” on the religious adherent to violate his 
beliefs. Id. at *27.
105 At that point, criminal contempt takes over. See, e.g., 3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 703 (4th ed.) (“Because the justification of imprisonment for 
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take the reporter’s word that she will never comply; every reporter would 
simply learn to say the right words. Instead, the judge must make a 
predictive judgment about whether the reporter will comply.106 And judges 
making these decisions seem to be well aware of how speculative their 
judgments will inevitably be.107
CONCLUSION
Martyrdom is a fascinating topic with a long history, much of it having 
nothing to do with law. But the law too must address martyrdom. It must 
decide what to do about martyrs, just as martyrs must decide what to do 
about the law. The resulting relationship, dialectical and iterative, leads to 
some knotty puzzles regarding faith and law, and provides a unique 
window into what religious liberty is all about. Rather than trying to solve 
those puzzles, this Essay instead tries simply to describe the view through 
that window.
                                                                                                                         
civil contempt is to induce compliance with the court’s order, the defendant can no longer be confined 
after compliance becomes impossible [or] [w]hen it becomes obvious that sanctions for contempt are 
not going to compel compliance.”).
106 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 994 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Essentially, the 
judge is called upon to predict whether the contemnor has in turn correctly predicted his own 
obstinacy.”).
107 See Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (“A district judge’s determination 
whether a civil contempt sanction has lost any realistic possibility of having a coercive effect is 
inevitably far more speculative than his resolution of traditional factual issues.”).
